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 Trade Union Internationalism 
 
Large international trade union organizations date back to the nineteenth century. Broadly 
speaking, they emerged between 1890 and 1914, defining themselves on a geographical 
basis(countries) and in terms of a  particular profession or trade1. The latter (the 
International Trade Secretariats) were the oldest form. They were born out of the necessity 
to share information about working conditions, but equally important were developments 
such as the viaticum, which guaranteed the same rights to  both foreign and local union 
members, especially  with respect to diamond workers and other artisanal  craftsmen. 
National unions of particular professions also wanted  to cooperate internationally for  
another reason, i.e. to prevent wage rates from being adversely affected by international 
competition or production being transferred to other plants in case of strike action2. 
National federations of trade unions did not start to co-operate until almost two decades 
later, when the International Secretariat of National Trade Union Secretariats was 
established3. The latter was rather an exchange platform, providing mainly administrative 
support. It explicitly refused to take cross-border action and promote political views, as it 
was bowing to pressure from  the powerful German trade union movement in particular. 
There were substantial ideological differences between the European unions and the 
German trade union movement attempted to smother the political debate by adopting a 
narrow definition of the role of the international trade union movement.  
The international trade union movement disintegrated during the First World War and  
national unions aligned themselves with their respective governments. A group of unions 
from allied countries managed to hold several international congresses, hoping that key 
demands of the labour movement could be met after the war, such as the eight-hour 
working day and the development of international labour law4. This group was joined by the 
American Federation of Labor(AFL),  when the US entered the war in April 1917. It became 
even more influential, not least because AFL chairman Samuel Gompers was on good terms 
with the American president Wilson and acted as if he were his representative when 
performing his international duties5. Allied unions now openly expressed their support for 
the Wilsonian vision of a new world order, which included the establishment of the League 
of Nations and the International Labour Organization(ILO).  The first International Labour 
Conference was held in Washington DC  in October 1919 .  Preparations for this conference 
gave efforts to reunite the unions a tremendous boost, which resulted in the International 
Federation of Trade Unions(IFTU) being founded in Amsterdam, in July 19196. This 
organization was to play a pivotal role in the international trade union movement in 
subsequent decades, not least because they controlled the Workers Group which held a 
virtual monopoly on labour representation within ILO. IFTU  had to compete with two rival 
organizations, a Christian one7 and a communist one, Profintern,8 but was not open for 
collaboration with any of them.  
With a few exceptions, such as the International Transport Workers Federation, the 
International Trade Secretariats(ITS) were much less developed. Lack of adequate resources 
generally prevented them from finding the right professional staff . Hence, international 
trade unions were not building on firm foundations: they had a  membership of millions, but 
meagre resources, although the rank-and- file members did experience a sense of belonging 
to an international community. 
The American Federation of Labor: the Leninist approach. 
 
 American trade unions, despite having played an important role in drafting the ILO charter 
at the end of the war (i. e. Gompers chaired the committee on labour legislation at the 
peace conference), did not join the international trade union organizations, mirroring the 
attitude of their government which did not join the League of Nations and opposed ILO 
membership.  AFL resumed its international activities in 1934, after the US joined the ILO  
under president F.D.Roosevelt. It joined IFTU and immediately started playing a leading role 
in it, endorsing American exceptionalism and thus favouring free and  independent unions 
within a free and democratic society.  This view was implemented in the fight against fascism 
and Nazism in Europe9. Hence, outside the existing union structure, special agencies were 
created to back the action of underground union groups in Germany and Italy from 1934 
onwards. They mounted the first ‘covert operations’, devoid of any financial and 
organizational transparency.  Also, the names of George Meany and Jay Lovestone popped 
up for the first time, respectively as director and chief executive. During the Second World, 
more such operations were conducted, as the unions were working closely together with the 
American secret service, the Office of Strategic Services(OSS). The latter was particularly 
helpful in assisting Lovestone and his men to divert (relief) aid to other purposes such as 
support for democratic  trade unions in Europe.  
After the Second World War, AFL’s fight against fascism and Nazism was smoothly replaced 
by  the fight against communism. Communism was a threat to AFL core values, as it simply 
could not tolerate  free and independent trade union movements. Consequently, AFL  
rejected a British proposal to establish a union international which mirrored the war alliance 
and would include the Soviet trade unions, i.e. the World Federation of Trade 
Unions(WFTU)10, which was to split the international trade union movement at the end of 
the Second World War. During the final stages of the war, AFL launched a major campaign 
against WFTU and the Soviet trade unions, pursuing a policy which was widely at variance 
with official American foreign policy and could be regarded as the start  of what would 
become the Cold War11. And as AFL deeds always matched its words, it went looking for the 
means to continue with its wartime policy, by cooperating with the CIA, the follow-up 
organization of  OSS. The Free Trade Union Committee(FTUC) was used as a tool to intervene 
directly wherever ‘free’ reformist unions were pressured by the communist ones. This 
strategy was first put to the test in  France and Italy12, but as the decolonization process 
gathered pace in the 1950s and 1960s and new  and often shaky regimes came to power, 
AFL intervened globally and more actively to prevent the latter ‘from falling prey to 
international communism’13.  As Federico Romero observed they looked at trade unionism 
as one front of a fundamentally political and strategic warfare in a ‘genuinely Leninist 
matter’14 
 AFL views at that time were similar to those of president Truman. In his Four Point  
Program(January, 1949), Truman outlined US development policy, which was ‘essentially 
perceived as a transfer of Western ideology towards non-communist Least Developed 
Countries’15. It was further developed by the State Department in the early 1950s. The 
promotion of a system of advanced industrial relations figured prominently in it, as did the 
trade union movement, provided it was solid, committed and convinced that it could benefit 
from such a system.  Equally important was the pivotal role of the Labour Department in  
creating  and consolidating a positive social climate.  The latter was an essential prerequisite 
for economic development and prosperity, which, in turn, was the best guarantee against 
communist-oriented revolutionary movements. The US government started implementing 
this policy immediately after the war, through aid programmes and funding schemes. 
However, it did realize that conditions on the ground often required non-state actors to be 
involved. Direct aid was often a politically sensitive issue, so it was deemed appropriate for 
local partners to be monitored by organizations which shared the American view on  
development policy. With respect to the labour movement, these organizations were the 
International Confederation of Trade Unions(ICFTU), which split from WFTU in 1949, the 
AFL-CIO, home to the FTUC, and the ILO, under American leadership (David Morse16) since 
1948. Hence, the unions became even more entangled with US government.  Modeled on 
the ‘Labor desk’ example within OSS, several departments within the US Administration set 
up liaison bureaus which dealt with labour policy issues  and were staffed by AFL-CIO 
confidants, such as  the Labor Department and subsequent Foreign Assistance Agencies17, 
which were responsible for development aid. In 1961, Arthur Goldberg, secretary of Labor 
and former OSS labor desk boss, appointed an assistant for international Labor Affairs18. And 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk went even one step further by appointing AFL’s George 
Delaney19 as ‘special advisor to the secretary of state , with purview over all international 
labor activities channeled through State, Labor or Aid’20, in 1963.  US global action in the 
field of labour was now directly monitored by a confidant of Jay Lovestone and a close 
collaborator of George Meany. A situation that was maintained until the mid-1970’s. 
 
 
 
 
An American International Trade Union Secretariat(ITS): ‘Evangelist of oil unionism’21 
 
In the early 1950s the Oil , Chemical and Atomic Workers International22 Union(OWIU)23 
from Denver (Colorado)  wanted the ICFTU to examine whether there was a need for an 
International Trade Secretariat(ITS) for the oil industry.  This initiative has to be understood 
in the context of the above-mentioned  US global action in the field of labour. 
Representatives of the oil unions saw each other  at meetings of the ILO Petrol Committee, 
in Geneva(1950) and Scheveningen(1952). In 1950, IFCTU  decided to conduct a survey about 
the needs of oil trade unions. Results of this survey were discussed at a new conference  of 
the oil unions, in 1952. They got a mixed reception, as British representatives, among others, 
worried about the financial consequences of yet another ITS, but American and French 
representatives were in favour, because “the World Federation of Trade Unions has already 
a section for the petroleum industry”24. Also, oil unions were aware of the global nature of 
the oil industry. And particularly Western unions did not want wage rates to be adjusted 
downwards. It was important to the IFPW founding fathers that their membership included 
all workers, ranging from the oilfield workers to the refinery  and  delivery workers, because 
all of them were employed by the same multinational companies and “ an international 
organization must speak with the international industry”25. Admittedly, a number of  ITS did 
not function properly. And many unions were profoundly dissatisfied with this, but the 
Americans argued that those ITS were almost exclusively concerned with European issues, a 
long-standing complaint within the international trade union movement. 
Preparatory work on establishing a new ITS was done in Denver by Loyd Haskins, an 
American who was appointed as temporary executive secretary. He was assisted by André 
Miffre from Force Ouvrière (France). A sufficient number of unions eventually agreed on 
convening a founding congress,  in Paris, in April 1954.  It was attended by delegates from 14 
countries, all representing unions from the oil industry. Representatives from the USA, Latin 
America, the Middle East and Asia were elected to the Executive Committee26. ‘Jack’ O.A. 
Knight, the OWIU chairman, was elected chairman, while Loyd Haskins was appointed as 
general secretary on a permanent basis. From the start it was clear that the Americans 
would have to bear the brunt of the costs, for many unions from South America, the Middle 
East and Asia, which were truly interested in such an ITS, could not even pay the travel 
expenses for their delegates27. The statutes laid down a membership fee of 2 dollar cent per 
month per member, but organizations could negotiate a lower membership fee, as was said 
in the accompanying note28. 
To establish a new ITS could not be taken for granted , given that the existing International 
Trade Secretariats covered almost all industrial workers. It was clear from the outset that it 
could become embroiled in jurisdictional disputes with them, particularly the ones which 
were representing the transport and chemical workers. No wonder that the IFPW founding 
fathers clearly identified the unions which were to be represented by it. e. ‘free trade unions 
of all countries/…/ engaged in the production, pipeline transportation, refining, petro-
chemical operations and marketing of petroleum and natural gas and the related operations 
of allied groups’29. Nevertheless, this new initiative was perceived as a threat by the ITS of 
the chemical workers, as the ILO did not fail to notice30. And it  did become a real threat in 
1963 , when IFPW decided to start representing unions from the chemical industry too, 
making its intentions absolutely clear by changing its name to the International Federation of 
Petroleum and Chemical Workers(IFPCW)31. 
In short, potential jurisdictional  disputes with existing ITS’s and an obvious lack of finance 
put a huge burden on IFPCW, given that it envisaged membership for poorly organized and 
often newly-founded unions from the South, while major organizations from the West, such 
as the British TUC32, did not want to commit themselves. 
Mission and modus operandi 
IFPCW was financed by the American trade union movement. It exercised full control over 
the organization and defined its mission and modus operandi. IFPCW’s key objective was ‘to 
share American labor practices and political economy with developing countries’ petroleum 
and chemical unions in the midst of decolonization to empower its affiliates and to battle 
communist presence among workers in the Third World.’33 The American model had to be 
copied, and union leaders from developing nations had to become familiar with it  and learn 
to appreciate it through training, travel and scholarships. IFPCW  views were in line with US 
political objectives in its global fight for hegemony during the Cold War, i.e. the 
establishment of solid industrial relations. They were close to American exceptionalist views 
and the mission that the American trade union movement pursued, i.e. to act as ‘vital 
distributors of American principles in a bid to shape the world’s social and cultural orders’34. 
In addition to this political issue, there was also an important union issue. US petrol industry 
paid high wages. The latter were now at risk, as  in an economy that was increasingly global 
American wage rates could be adversely affected by low wages elsewhere. Oil workers in the 
developing countries earned just a fraction of the income of their American colleagues. Also, 
this could potentially jeopardize American exports and, ultimately, American economic 
growth35. In other words, by expressing support for these workers, American unions also 
wanted to meet a long-term objective of the international labour movement, i.e. to maintain 
their high wage rates36. The argument was probably also valid in the case of  many other 
industries, but the important thing was that even in developing countries, in which the 
economy was often still predominantly rural, the oil industry paid the highest wages, 
relatively speaking. And as IFPCW chairman Jack Knight believed that  ‘high-level wages’ 
were a step on the road to a  ‘high- level economy’ , the oil industry in developing countries 
could be  one of the main driving forces for economic growth and, consequently, for 
developing ‘American style’ welfare states.   
IFPCW thus operated within a  framework that was clear and acceptable to the international 
free trade union movement. ILO too welcomed IFPCW, because it represented a reliable 
negotiating partner  which could participate in the ILO Petroleum Industrial Committee 
meetings. 
Institutional issues 
 Not until several years later did IFPCW become  a fully-fledged organization. It established a 
global network between 1954 and 1959, with its headquarters in Denver and regional offices 
in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. And it saw its membership numbers soar.  
According to a report presented to the third world congress(Amsterdam, 1960) by general 
secretary Haskins, 34 organizations had joined IFPCW, representing 500.000 members, from 
24 countries. By 1966, when the fifth world congress was held in Caracas, IFPCW had again 
increased its membership, which now totaled almost one million, with 153 organizations, 
from 78 countries. By 1972, the membership was about 1,2 million. 
IFPCW tools included the monthly magazine ‘Petro’ and the weekly newsletters ‘Petrogram’ 
and the ‘Union Builder’. Especially Petro, which was published in 5 different languages37 and 
distributed in 70 countries, propagated the American way of life. In addition, trade union 
delegations were invited to Denver for training purposes, and were touring the USA, 
afterwards. Unlike many other ITS’s,  IFPCW was much more present on the ground. It 
provided advice and assistance during strikes, arranged visits to Asia, Africa, Latin America 
and the Middle East, and held seminars for local union officials in Beirut, Kampala and 
Greece. Wherever IFPCW was present, union staff were being trained in order to ‘assume 
positions of responsibility in their communities’38. Annually, the average number of trainees 
was  between 500 and 700 in the 1960s. Most of them came from South America, as the 
IFPCW focus was unmistakably on that region. 
IFPCW was a fairly unique organization within the international trade union movement for 
other reasons too. Its  staff members showed considerable diversity, despite the fact that 
IFPCW  was being led by Americans, and it had an extensive network of local staff and 
offices. Thus, it tried to tailor its approach to the needs of every region, though strictly 
following American rules and instructions.  Unlike most other ITS’s , which concentrated 
their efforts on  the well-known Western trade unions, IFPCW focused almost exclusively on 
the emerging economies in the South. Also in this respect the latter was quite unique. The 
British labour attaché in Beirut, R.L. Morris , a key witness in this case, said that IFPCW was 
‘outward looking, making a real effort to make an impact in the developing areas’, contrary 
to another ITS,  which he labeled as ‘a European club’39. 
An overview of the IFPCW program of the second half of 1963 reveals the scale of its 
activities40. Leaving aside the costs of its headquarter in Denver, IFPCW expenditures on the 
ground  totaled 272,667 dollars on a yearly basis. In Latin America, IFPCW operated in  
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and the Caribbean. Regional offices had 
been established in Bogota, Buenos Aires and the Caribbean. IFPCW cooperated with ORIT 
and AIFLD to counter WFTU influence in the oil industry in the region, as  the latter was 
considered a‘ prime target’ by WFTU, according to Haskins.  In the Near East, IFPCW 
operated in  Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan and Aden, but its main operating base was 
Lebanon, where  it maintained close contact with George Sacre, of the Lebanese union of 
petrol workers. In addition, IFPCW also had a presence in Asian countries such as Japan, 
Indonesia, India, Ceylon, Burma, the Philippines and Singapore, where its regional office was 
based. In Africa, IFPCW operated in Nigeria, Senegal, Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, 
Liberia, Congo and Congo Brazzaville, Kenya and Southern Rhodesia. Loyd Haskins, Franz 
Loriaux and Robert Goss were responsible for maintaining regular contact with local 
organizations. They travelled around the world, providing support and advice on conflict 
management and collective bargaining. 
The annual budget also reflected the fact that the focus was on Latin America. 45% of the  
resources were being  allocated to Latin American projects, while 30% to African ones  and 
only a meager 10% to projects in the Near East.   A relatively large amount of these 
resources were spent on organizing local conferences, and seminars and training courses. 
Part of the latter took place in Texas. The amount of direct subsidy given to local 
organizations was rather small. It helped to cover the costs of printing materials, office 
supplies and other practical items, such as the purchase of a car for the Nigerian Oil 
Chemical and Allied Workers’ Union.  But as these organizations operated in a context in 
which nearly everything was lacking, they were eager for the American money. They fought 
for it, and sometimes this was taken literally. 
 IFPCW thus was the most active ITS, especially in the South. Other less well –resourced ITS’s 
were particularly annoyed about the way in which  an American ITS, funded by the American 
government, handed out money. They felt IFPCW was ‘competing unfairly’ and were deeply 
dissatisfied.  The potential  ‘jurisdictional dispute” with the ITS  of the Chemical Industry 
(ICF), which had arisen at the establishment of IFPCW, escalated  when Charles Levinson was 
appointed as the new general secretary, in 1966.  He fiercely opposed IFPCW claims to 
represent the chemical workers. And he  undermined the IFPCW position in the international 
trade union movement by referring to the support the CIA was allegedly providing to IFPCW 
foreign programmes. IFPCW was put in a difficult position in a number of countries, as it now 
came to be  identified with ‘American imperialism’. It was significant that two Syrian 
participants prematurely left a training seminar in Beirut and held a press conference at 
which they accused IFPCW of ‘imperialism’, because of its links with the American 
authorities and multinational companies41.  
In 1967, IFPCW suffered a new blow to its reputation, as  it had clearly made an attempt to 
influence the result of the internal union elections  in Brazil and faced allegations of bribery. 
The event was widely  covered by the media, adding to already  existing tensions. Both the 
Brazilian parliament and the Brazilian minister of labour, ‘who has well-known European 
sympathies and a fear of American dominance’, were forced to  set up a commission to 
investigate the allegations42.  The accusation later turned out to be false, but the prevailing 
image of American union imperialism could not be countered. IFPCW’s credibility had been 
damaged, its ability to take action was obviously affected, not only  on the ground but surely 
also within the international trade union movement. Atypical in many respects, IFPCW was 
now becoming increasingly isolated within ICFTU.     
In 1969, AFL-CIO disaffiliated from ICFTU and this was not very helpful too. IFPCW was now 
more purely American than ever before, and member organizations felt  increasingly uneasy 
about its financial links. Several small unions from The Netherlands, Switzerland and 
France43 already had resigned their membership, in 1967. Global IFPCW policies were not 
really affected by it, but it showed that European unions were increasingly alarmed at 
developments within IFPCW. Awkward questions were increasingly being raised. Who was in 
charge? Had IFPCW become a mere puppet manipulated by the CIA? Questions which could 
deal a lethal blow to IFPCW.  A merger with  ICF seemed to be a possible way out, but 
relations with Charles Levinson were at an all-time low, as CIA money was obviously 
intended to be used for training Latin American chemical union officials. In 1975 a failed 
merger attempt with the ICF provoked the exit of OCAW from the IFPCW44. As a result 
IFPCW  could no longer receive funding from USAID sources45 which in only a few months 
resulted in the winding up of the organization.  
 
IFPCW/ICFTU development assistance: a sensible option? 
 
Does foreign assistance  make sense in countries where trade unions are under pressure and 
have difficulty in consolidating their position? And if it does, how does one operate in such 
countries? National and international trade unions have been facing such questions regularly 
in their history. And large national federations have seldom revised their views on the issue, 
despite different contexts. For example, the British TUC, when facing Italian fascism in the 
1920s and 1930s, believed that self-financing was the only possibility worth considering in 
trying to create a strong  trade union movement. Expressing solidarity with the victims of 
dictatorships was, at best, what one could do. American unions, on the contrary, strongly 
believed in external financing for German and Italian underground groups and unions in exile 
during the Second World War46.  The British took a purely trade union perspective, i.e. to 
build strong trade unions, while the Americans, then as now, pursued a political objective, 
i.e.  to build unions as pillars of  democratic regimes and  as a counterbalance to political 
extremism. 
Hence, ICFTU too was seen by them as primarily a political project, when it came into 
existence in 1949  following the rift between reformist and communist organizations within 
WFTU. And when AFL merged with CIO – an enfeebled organization - in 1955 and AFL-CIO 
was established, the latter  implemented AFL foreign policy. Besides, CIO had never actively 
pursued foreign policy goals during its short-lived existence. Only OWIU47 had done so, being 
the union which had launched the initiative to establish IFPCW and whose activities were 
initially viewed with  an amount of suspicion by the AFL leadership48. 
AFL preferred an independent bilateral approach and established direct links with friendly 
organizations throughout the world. Others were not supposed to meddle in  AFL affairs. 
Nevertheless, at particular moments in its history AFL did  adopt a multilateral approach. 
Basically,  AFL was opportunistic in handling international issues. Usually, the end justified 
the means.  
It took several years for  the  wounds Inflicted at the end of the war to heal, but after 1955 
AFL–CIO played a prominent role within ICFTU.  The latter was used as one of the tools to 
implement its foreign policy, i.e.  one that was  giving AF-CIO more financial leverage.  
Adopting a (semi-)multilateral approach  was therefore in its own interests. Conversely, 
multilateralism at least provided other national federations, such as the British TUC,  with an 
opportunity to establish a framework which imposed constraints on increasingly global US 
activities and which was accepted by the Americans. The British in particular felt particularly 
uneasy about  American activities in regions which (formerly) belonged to the  British 
empire. For strategic reasons president Meany in 1960 accepted to punt an end to the 
independent international activities of AFL-CIO49, hence, for almost a decade, ICFTU was to 
play a pivotal international role, through the International Solidarity Fund(ISF). By 
international trade union standards, ISF was a powerful tool, because it could mobilize 
substantial resources and did not fail to secure the support of AFL-CIO, after Omer Becu had 
been appointed as new ICFTU general secretary in 1960. Becu  initially enjoyed the 
confidence of the Americans. He  had been actively cooperating with the labor desk of the 
American intelligence service OSS during the war. Consequently, he was familiar with 
programmes which included direct and indirect financing of unions by secret services.  And 
those who had monitored those programmes, such as Arthur Goldberg, George Meany, 
David Dubinsky and Jay Lovestone, were personally known to him. But for Jay Lovestone and 
Irving Brown, ICFTU and certainly the British TUC where too soft on communism and they 
did not want to give up their own operations, ‘Yes, keep the shingle, the 
shadow - ICFTU - but don't give up the substance, an independent American trade union 
policy and operation relative not only to our American government but to all others 
governments plus the European unions.’50 
It did not take long before IFPCW knew of the existence of ISF and tried to finance an 
important part of its projects through this channel. From 1960 onwards, it successfully 
applied for funding to the ICFTU. Initially, it received nearly 60, 00051  dollars in grant money 
from the ISF, while its total expenditures amounted to approximately 120, 000 dollars. 
However, from 1963 onwards, questions were increasingly being raised within ICFTU about 
the scale of IFPCW  operations and  about the IFPCW presence in  countries which had hardly 
any oil or capacity to refine oil. Expenditures for IFPCW development assistance grew 
massively and doubled more or less, from 1962 to 1963. ISF board members thus became 
increasingly cautious about spending so much money on IFPCW projects, as it could prompt 
other ITS’s to ask for a similar amount of funding. Which they actually did. 
Questions were also raised about the efficiency of this form of development aid. Especially, 
the British TUC rejected an ‘external’ approach and pointed to the potentially corrupting 
effects of financing unions which could not survive by themselves52. The Americans, 
however, continued to believe in a top-down approach, despite the fact that there was 
evidence on the ground to suggest otherwise . Even IFPCW had to admit that ‘in many of 
these countries the leaders do not really represent a trade union, but have set themselves 
up as the leaders with the followers still to be developed.’53 The main lesson to be learned 
from this was that IFPCW had to provide more training courses for staff people. Haskins said  
in his report: ‘The people in leadership need training from the ground up and they know 
little or nothing of the operations of a union or union administration in any form. It has been 
necessary that small subsidies be paid to these unions in order that they can keep body and 
soul together and have some semblance of a trade union.’54 This is also what IFPCW figures 
suggest:   limited material assistance,  in combination with training and consultancy, 
provided by regional representatives, based in regional offices. 
These events need to be set in the context of growing American dissatisfaction about the 
way in which ISF and the ICFTU leadership operated. Meany and his supporters were  
annoyed about the too ‘soft’ attitude international organizations took towards communism. 
ICFTU expansion came to an end in 1964, when the British TUC and the American AFL-CIO 
jointly opposed a strong ISF, although for different reasons. The Americans argued they had 
yet to see substantial results from multilateralism in the fight to contain communism in 
Africa. They resolutely opted  for establishing bilateral relations again. Probably, this decision 
was not unrelated to the generous funding that was provided by the American government, 
through the Alliance for Progress Programme. The latter poured millions into development 
policy in Latin America. By comparison, ISF means were utterly insignificant. No labour 
movement was capable of mobilizing such an amount of resources.   
The strained relationship between AFL-CIO and ICFTU leaders was further escalating after 
1965. Eventually, the Americans left ICFTU in 1969. The consequences of this decision for the 
International Solidarity Fund and IFPCW were considerable. To be an ‘American ITS’ ceased 
to be an asset. Moreover, in the mid-sixties it was revealed that American unions had been 
massively funded by the CIA to  mount their foreign operations. It caused quite a scandal in 
the USA, but also within ICFTU, as the latter too had been funded – to a limited extent – by 
one of the cover-up agencies of the CIA. Hence, American development programs were 
increasingly viewed with suspicion. But, for the time being, the ICFTU leadership decided not 
to produce a  political response, but a formal one. As IFPCW and ISF were still questioning 
each other’s competencies, it put new requests for ISF funding on hold, from 1966 onwards. 
This represented a serious setback for IFPCW, prompting the latter to reconsider its policy 
on the ground, though not preventing it from further establishing its global network. 
IFPCW  was now more financially dependent on AFL-CIO than ever before, while the latter 
largely depended on public funds itself. Moreover, transparent management of these funds 
was severely hampered by the fact that the Americans fiercely defended the concept of 
‘Free Trade Unions’, rejecting any government intervention. That is why they became 
entangled in  web of cover-agencies and fake foundations. 
Dependency of American public funds and ‘territorial’ rivalry with existing ITS  proved a 
lethal cocktail to IFPCW, in 1975. However the exact circumstances for the sudden closing of 
their activities remain unclear55. 
Nevertheless, we need to ask ourselves whether any results had been achieved in those 
twenty years  and how IFPCW activities had been perceived on the ground. Looking at these 
issues from a broader perspective: how  was the IFPCW model, based on modernization 
theories which assume that labour can play a crucial role in a gradual development process, 
put into practice? How was it received in the South, in different economic, social, cultural 
and religious contexts? And did people in these regions identify with the bipolar image of the 
world during the Cold War? Today we know, from previous research on American trade 
union intervention in Latin America, that the agency of local partners played a crucial role in 
modifying models that were imported from abroad and in playing one model off against 
another for their own benefit. Hence, Federico Romero was quite right to ask ‘whether the 
Cold War paradigm is at all useful as an analytical tool’56. We will try to explore this issue by 
presenting the case of the oil workers union during the strikes in Aden, in 1956 and 1960.  
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A question of agency? Aden Petroleum Workers,1955-1963 
 
Aden was a small British colony until 1968. It managed to grab the news headlines regularly 
for almost a decade in the early 60’s, because of its strategic position and its unstable 
political situation. Its economy was rural, until a number of western companies established 
themselves at the port of Aden, following the nationalization of BP in Iran, in 1951. Aside 
from shipping through that port, the main industrial activity was oil refining. Both British 
Petroleum and Shell had premises in Aden and hired local workers, expats as well as migrant 
workers from Pakistan and India. Major international powers, emerging Arab nations(Egypt), 
international organizations and trade unions (communist and free) focused their attention 
on Aden for geopolitical and economic reasons. Class, nationalism, ethnicity and religion 
produced an explosive cocktail, whose potential impact threatened to go far beyond little 
Aden. 
Aden and the entire Arab world was for IFPCW providing a unique opportunity. Unlike in Asia 
and South America, where IFPCW was accepted by the major oil concerns and could 
therefore fully support the ‘democratic’ trade union movement, ‘the operating companies in 
the area jealously safeguarded their traditional isolation, and the local governments feared 
trade union development of any sort.’57 There was no well-established tradition of collective 
bargaining and AFPCW tried to negotiate agreements with the headquarters of the oil 
concerns as well as with the local management  in order to install some western form of 
industrial relations. The local unions were, of course, fully ignorant about the latter.  And 
again, that was why IFPCW attached supreme importance to training.  
British rule in Aden consisted of a governor presiding over a limited number of ministers, 
and a strong police force. The latter included a highly active intelligence service, which 
closely monitored even the smallest of organizations and used repressive tactics whenever 
necessary. From the early 1950s onwards, Aden saw the development of a burgeoning trade 
union movement, which adhered to ICFTU. Most of the unions were established after 1952, 
while action was taken from the mid-fifties onwards. It often resulted in protracted conflicts, 
such as the one which involved the BP oil refinery and the BP Refinery Employees Union, led 
by Abdullah Ali Ubaid.  The latter was affiliated with the Aden TUC,  which initially included 
25 trade unions and had an estimated membership of about 25, 000. 
The trade union took strong action for the first time in March 1956. It went on for more than 
a month and  started on March 3 when three employees of a  company run by the British 
were fired. Within a couple of days, this prompted other workers to go on strike, in Aden 
port and the BP and Shell oil refineries. The situation worsened from March 19 onwards as 
serious riots broke out and the police used live ammunition against protesters. Several of 
them were injured and one was shot dead. The strike which appeared to be an industrial 
conflict at first,  gradually developed into a wider conflict with political and religious 
undertones, also due to police intervention. The Egyptian leader Nasser criticized the British 
and urged the Yemenites to resist the latter. It also became clear that close links had been 
established between a number of union leaders and the United National Front, a new 
nationalist political movement. The strike generated mixed demands; some of them were 
purely industrial (higher wages, more decent accommodation, compensation for loss of 
Income during the strike); some of them were nationalist(against British rule, no prospect of 
independence in the governor’s speech, restrictions on immigration from Italy and Pakistan); 
and others were religious( adoption of the Muslim weekend, flexible working hours during 
Ramadan, celebration of Islamic holidays). Although some trade union demands were fully 
met( pay rises up to 20  per cent), the situation in the colony continued to be tense. The 
authorities tried to get it under control by introducing an industrial relations policy aimed at 
providing social harmony, which was seen by the governor  as  ‘ vital to the colony’s well-
being’.58 Help from the British TUC was therefore also requested, as the latter could train 
and advise Aden trade union leaders. The ICFTU, on the other hand, was expected to shield 
the Aden TUC from WFTU influences.  According to the governor’s report to the British 
government59, wages for the lowest categories of workers were too low and this is what had 
triggered strike action. The governor also emphasized that newly-built accommodation was 
the main reason why wages of these workers could no longer cover basic needs. Workers 
had moved to more decent  houses, with modern amenities like water and electricity, but 
they could not pay their higher rent. Likewise, better schools were now available to them, 
but school fees were raised, etc.   
A second big wave of strikes was sweeping Aden in November 1959. It came to an end in 
March 1960.  Protests were directly aimed at the BP oil refinery. Trade union leader Ubaid 
urged union members to prepare for a protracted conflict, as ‘the company was exploiting 
their country’. Again, demands were mixed (economic, political, religious), i.e  no 
discrimination of local workers concerning access to health care, the supply of free water 
and electricity, and recognition by BP  of  local religious holidays. Ubaid was not really 
appealing to working-class interests when talking about these issues; it was all about the 
discriminating treatment of native workers: ’British employees paid nothing for electricity 
and each one gets 10,000 gallons of free water for their gardens and  for washing their dogs, 
but the company refused to supply free water and electricity to its other employees’.60 This 
second wave of strikes attracted  even more international attention than the previous one. 
IFPCW sent an adviser to Aden, i.e. Franz Loriaux, who was supervising projects in the 
Middle East and Asia. Loriaux mediated between the oil union and the BP management. He 
realized that BP really wanted to reach a compromise and according to him working 
conditions in the refinery were reasonable, even to American standards. The only problem 
was, a collective agreement was lacking. The BP management was ready to accept an 
independent mediator and willing to start talks about a collective agreement once the strike 
had ended. However, BP trade union officials, supported by ATUC, rejected such proposals. 
According to Loriaux’s report, the ATUC general leader Asnag threatened to call for a general 
strike, as he was ranting at BP, the British and the government. He was quoted as saying the 
following:’ Si les gens souffrent de la faim, laissez-les. Peut-être est-ce dont ils ont besoin 
pour qu’ils prennent vraiment conscience de leur situation’.61 Loriaux realized that the BP 
union was facing relentless pressure from the ATUC nationalist leadership. Despite decent 
working conditions, strike action was inevitable, as ATUC felt that such action at BP was all 
too rare and through BP they wanted to hit the colonial authorities. Strike action was in line 
with pan-Arab nationalism. The latter made no distinction between companies and 
governments, economic and political demands. The chief  of the British secret police came to 
the same conclusion in February 1962. In a report, he noted that ATUC and its leader Asnag 
pursued a nationalist agenda: ‘It may well be their intention to damage the economy of 
Aden however much labour itself may suffer in consequence’.62 
The fact that this strike, as the previous one, took place during Ramadan was equally 
noteworthy. It had made Loriaux pretty  desperate and he suggested that the next envoy to 
Aden would get an assistant, because ‘ les Arabes sont debout toute la nuit et dormant 
pendant la journée au cours de cette période, tandis que les Brittaniques maintiennent leur 
horaire normale. Je finissait par travailler le jour et la nuit.’63 
The IFPCW representative also thought he noted a ‘lack of sincerity’ on the part of local 
union leaders. He was under the impression that they were using his presence to 
demonstrate to the Aden authorities that they could mobilize Western support. It was 
particularly helpful to them that  they  called upon the international free trade union 
movement and not upon their  pan-Arab network, although they felt much closer to the 
latter from an ideological point of view. Thus, Loriaux came to the conclusion that the Aden 
trade union was characterized by a  kind of ideological ambivalence, as it was connected 
both to pan-Arab nationalism and the international free trade union movement. Loriaux did 
not fail to see that it held mutually contradictory beliefs.  
This view carried even more weight after the 1960 strike movement had ended and the Arab 
Federation of Petrol Workers(AFPW) was established in Cairo, on January 19 1961. AFPW 
joined ICATU( International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions), under the leadership of 
Anwar Salma, the Egyptian IFPCW vice-president. According to the British intelligence service 
in Aden, the decision to establish AFPW had been a side issue at an  IFPCW seminar.  The 
thing that made AFPW statutes so noteworthy was that they were the same cocktail of class, 
nationalism and religion. Under the slogan ‘God is the patron for success’, AFPW expressed 
its belief in pan-Arab nationalism as ‘a strong bulwark against imperialism, exploitation, 
reaction, deviation and bias’.  And the key aim was: ‘To unite the ranks of Arab Petroleum 
workers, support the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions by all possible 
means, spread the spirit of Arab nationalism among the ranks of workers, keep informed of 
events in the Arab world and support national liberation movements in order to achieve 
freedom, independence and social welfare in all parts of the Arab homeland.’ 64 
The trade unions in Aden suffered severe repression after the 1960 strike. Their leaders, 
such as Ubaid, were sentenced to many months in jail. This repression radicalized the Aden 
trade unions, the nationalist fervor intensified and the extreme National Liberation Front 
gradually managed to secure key positions for itself within the trade unions and the petrol 
union in particular. Ubaid, having left prison, was sidelined too and replaced by more radical 
nationalist figures. 
The free trade union movement and IFPCW were faced with a dilemma when ICATU and 
AFPW were established. On the one hand, they had to keep supporting the latter in a 
attempt to prevent WFTU and communism from having control of the entire Arab region. On 
the other hand, it was clear that unconditional loyalty to the international free trade union 
movement may not be expected from them. Loriaux’s mission had provided proof of this. 
The Aden trade unions resolutely refused to take sides. On the contrary, they communicate 
openly with ICFTU and IFPCW about their communist contacts. They accepted invitations 
from the German Democratic Republic and Yugoslavia, and were  present at WFTU solidarity 
conferences in 1964 and 1968,  and at a conference of Mediterranean and Black Sea Oil 
Workers in Cairo, in 1968. At the same time, they became involved in IFPCW initiatives and 
responded positively and regularly to IFPCW sponsored invitations for representatives to 
come to London, Brussels and Geneva. On these occasions, they asked for and received 
political, financial and material support, for example to furnish their new premises in Aden. 
Thus, ATUC views were in line  with pan-Arab nationalism. The latter also drew support from 
the labour movement and the oil workers in the Middle East. It was a development which 
was plain to see and easy to understand by contemporaries, both in the labour movement 
and in government. Less attention was, however, given to the religious aspect. Islam was not 
initially perceived as a potential revolutionary  movement, despite the presence of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, in the person of Anwar Salama and others65. The Aden trade union 
movement held both nationalist and Islamic views and beliefs. And there was a link between 
both elements, as was also shown in the discourse of trade union leaders. 
Although more research is necessary, the history of labour internationalism in the Petroleum 
sector during the cold war seem to confirm the ‘site-specific’ character of labor ideology, 
strategies and policies and questions the usefulness of the cold war paradigm as analytical 
tool66. 
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